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Abstract
Election boycotts are a common occurrence in unconsolidated democracies, particu-
larly in the developing world, with prominent examples from recent years occurring in
Venezuela, Zimbabwe, and Ethiopia. Despite the frequent occurrence of boycotts, there
are few studies available in the scholarly literature concerning the effectiveness of elec-
toral boycotts, particularly as a strategy of opposition parties seeking to bring about
the end of electoral authoritarian governments. This paper is based in the democratiza-
tion literature, with a particular focus on the behavior and vulnerabilities of hybrid or
electoral authoritarian regimes. Using an original dataset with global coverage including
hybrid regimes from 1981 to 2006, this paper uses event-history analysis to determine the
efficacy of boycotts in national elections among other risk factors thought to undermine
electoral authoritarian regimes as well as the possibilities for subsequent democratization
occurring following both contested and boycotted electoral processes.
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Boycotts of elections have been a recurring event in news reports from around the world:
Ethiopia, Egypt, Kosovo, Venezuela, and the list continues to grow. Even if they are
contested, many elections today are still accompanied with the threat of boycotting by
some parties. What remains to be answered is whether or not election boycotts actually
work. Can a political party achieve success by overtly avoiding competition in national
elections or do boycotts simply break down the electoral process and with it any hopes
for regime change and democracy?
Given the recurrence of opposition boycotts in many elections around the world, the
topic of election boycotts is certainly a relevant topic for study. Of particular concern
is why these boycotts should continue to be used by opposition groups despite the fact
that they defy the logical conclusion that if given the opportunity to contest and gain
influence in the government, a party should use this opening to gradually build support
through parliamentary opposition. The goal of studying boycotts is to better understand
if and when there are situations in which it is advantageous to the opposition to forgo
potential representation in government, and more specifically whether this form of protest
can bring about change either by bringing about a change in power by democratic means
or whether they break down the electoral system alltogether.
The question of the efficacy of election boycotts is also relevant to those who seek to
understand the nature of competition in unfair elections, as well as to those interested in
policies regarding strategies in unfair elections. These questions seek to provide an answer
to opposition parties and democracy promotion groups that are trying to determine the
best strategy and allocation of resources to oppose the ruling authoritarian regime in
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elections, either to contest the ruling regime in elections or boycott the electoral process
altogether.
Surprisingly, the topic has received very little attention in the comparative politics
literature despite the utility and gravity of the topic. Only very recently have there been
some works addressing the topic of election boycotts directly. Of these, only Staffan
Lindberg’s two works on boycotts in Africa during the 1990s have reached publication
(Lindberg 2004, 2006). The other works specifically focusing on boycotts comprise a
number of conference papers and a PhD dissertation by Emily Beaulieu covering a wide
range of issues concerning election boycotts during the 1990s. Her works have a partic-
ular focus on the influence of international observers in conjunction with boycotts on
democratization (Beaulieu 2006a, 2004, 2006b). Both authors focus largely on answering
the question of when boycotts are likely to occur and some of the immediate outcomes
of boycotts (Beaulieu 2006b, Lindberg 2004, 2006). In addition to these, Schedler has
included election boycotts along with protests and various sorts of incumbent manipula-
tion as one of the factors related to the degree of competitiveness between incumbents
and oppositions in authoritarian elections (Schedler 2007).
The literature lacks a systematic answer to the more general question of how boycotts
influence the survival of the incumbent regimes that maintain unfair election processes.
Also we still know little about the exact nature of boycotts across the range of hybrid
regime types. Beaulieu considers boycotts as a feature of the developing world, defined
as countries receiving foreign aid, while the remainder of studies focus only on cases in
Africa (Beaulieu 2006b, Lindberg 2004, 2006, Bratton 1998). Boycotts have not been
clearly assessed as a factor that may potentially cause democratization or other risks to
hybrid regimes.
My goal is to systematically assess the degree to which boycotts of elections to national
offices influence the prospects for democratization by looking at the risks of regime col-
lapse. I intend to look at this in two specific manners. The first is an analysis of whether
the decision to contest or boycott as my primary independent variable increases the risks
to an incumbent faction of falling to some other faction by elections both in the short
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term and over time. Alternatively I will investigate whether the decision to boycott or
contest an election leads to the breakdown of electoral politics in the country.
In order to assess this my first step will be to review what is known about the nature
of election boycotts, focusing on reasons for opposition parties to choose the option of
boycotting as opposed to electoral contestation as well as the effects this decision has
on regime survival and democratization. The second issue of importance is to determine
what composes the universe of regime types to which this study should apply and how
they fit into the general literature on regime types and operation. With a definition of
these two concepts I can further develop alternative models of the action of boycotts on
competition and survival in hybrid regimes and develop testable hypotheses concerning




Election boycotts have become an increasingly common phenomenon since 1990. When
defined as a situation in which a political party or faction that is legally allowed to
contest in elections makes a decision to organize active non-participation in the elections
by members and followers rather than contesting, election boycotts have occurred in some
form in 13% of all elections and 16% of elections in the developing world (Beaulieu 2006b).
The existing literature on boycotts focuses on three aspects of boycotts: a typology of
boycotts, a rational-choice modeling of the causes and motivations of boycotts, and the
long term and immediate effects of election boycotts.
2.1 Types
In the most comprehensive study on election boycotts in the developing world available,
Emily Beaulieu provides for a two-dimensional typology of election boycotts (2006b).
This typology of boycotts allows for different explanations of the causes and results of
election boycotts based upon the major characteristics of the particular boycott. The
first dimension is of the most importance to this project and is determined simply by the
level of involvement in the boycott. Her second dimension, violence, did not produce any
meaningful results and will not be used in the current analysis.
In a situation in which the majority of the opposition factions participate in the
boycott, a boycott is considered to be major by Beaulieu’s typology (2006b). Major
boycotts (and presumably total boycotts as well) are motivated largely by the level of
unfairness of an electoral process in which the opposition does not believe they can win
despite their popularity. This leads them to seek reforms to the electoral process that
will allow for a greater likelihood of turnover and continued democratic competition
4
(Beaulieu 2006b). Lindberg divides the level of participation into categories of total or
partial boycott, determined by the proportion of parties participating in the boycott
(2004). Schedler uses a four-part typology of boycotts including complete contestation,
threatened boycott, partial boycott, and full opposition boycott (2007).
At the other end of this axis is the minor boycott. These consist of small, minority
factions of the opposition and function quite differently from a major boycott. Parties
involved in a minor boycott are most typically ethnic minorities, regional minorities, or
anti-state/anti-system parties, and these parties are likely to be seeking side-payments
from the incumbent regime by causing the elections to be considered unfair rather than
protesting the existing levels of unfairness (Beaulieu 2006b). Parties that take part in
minor boycotts often fall within the gray area in which political parties are not considered
to be effective parties as having coalitional or blackmail potential, but do qualify under
Mainwaring and Scully’s definition of political parties as being any “group that would
present candidates for public office, but is unable to do so either because it is proscribed
or because elections are not being held,” (2, 1995).
2.2 Causes
The value of a boycott to an opposition party as opposed to contestation is derived from
a number of factors. Schedler models electoral protest, including boycotts, as a result
of three separate processes: an indicator of the diminished legitimacy of the incumbent
regime after repeated manipulation of the political process, the independent calculation
of the opposition to shape the outcome of the electoral process, or a calculation of the
opposition that protest will weaken the effectiveness of incumbent manipulation (2007).
When framed in the light of Schedler’s model of authoritarian competition as a two-
level game, the degree to which the parties value each level of the game determines the
competing values of contestation or protest (2006). An opposition party that values the
short term values of representation in gaining demands in the legislative process should
be more likely to contest, while those parties that consider the control of the rulemaking
process should value the benefits that they believe are derived from protest (following
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Schedler’s second and third processes).
Beaulieu and Lindberg both attribute this cost-benefit decision to the desire of the
opposition to achieve a higher level of electoral fairness in instances of major boycotts
(Beaulieu 2006b, Lindberg 2006). These boycotts are likely to occur in situations where
either a dominant opposition faction or a broad consensus of parties believe that fraud
and manipulation by the incumbent regime is all that stands in the way of incumbent
defeat and are willing to bear the costs of leading the boycott(Beaulieu 2006b). These
boycotts represent an acceptance of defeat in the short-term game in order to increase
the chances of success in the long term game of increased fairness.
Most of the above explanations are attributed to major boycotts, in which the party
must make a hard decision on forgoing the real possibility of winning meaningful repre-
sentation in office. In contrast, minor boycotts are not influenced by concerns of fairness
and are led by factions incapable of raising the popular or military support to overthrow
the regime, but may use either peaceful or violent boycott tactics to disrupt the polling
process in general in order to achieve their political goals (Beaulieu 2006b). Minor boy-
cotts are often associated with small parties that do not have a voter base in the entire
space of the country; largely being associated with ethnic minority parties and region-
based parties that are unlikely to ever win a significant representation in national office
(Beaulieu 2006b).
Alternative explanations also exist on the decision of parties to boycott an election.
Election boycotts may be carried out in order to mask the weakness of the opposition
parties. In these situations, a weak party will avoid contesting the election in order to
appear stronger through the organization of a boycott rather than face certain defeat
in elections, whether fair or unfair (Bratton 1998, Pastor 1999). Beaulieu attributes this
face-saving motivation largely to minor boycotts although it is conceivable that such
motivating factors could prompt even a total boycott if there is a weak opposition facing
a popular government that is capable of winning free and fair elections (Beaulieu 2006a).
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2.3 Effects
What are the outcomes of election boycotts? Answers to this question have generally
been divided into two categories; short term and long term outcomes. One of the logical,
immediate outcomes of a boycott is a noticeable depression of turnout (Beaulieu 2006b,
Lindberg 2006). This comes from the understanding that if major opposition parties
instruct their followers to avoid the polls there will clearly be a lower turnout as a direct
effect of the opposition boycott. Turnout may be further reduced if the opposition parties
time the boycott in such a way that only candidates of the incumbent faction appear
unopposed on the ballot (Beaulieu 2006b). These effects hold up in testing of developing
countries by Beaulieu and of African elections by Lindberg for major boycotts (Beaulieu
2006b, Lindberg 2006). Minor boycotts, because of the small size and influence of minor
parties, are not expected to be capable of reducing the turnout significantly unless they
take part in a violent disruption of the process (Beaulieu 2006b).
Schedler also finds that the degree of electoral competition (as measured by the dif-
ference between the first and second placing parties) is also significantly reduced as a
result of election boycotts (2007). This result fits well with Beaulieu and Lindberg’s find-
ings, but only provides insight into the degree to which boycotts are followed. All of these
results indicate that boycotts when called for are carried out by voters but not much else.
The reduction in competition based on election results indicates one of two possibilities:
either that the cases in which the bulk of parties boycott are influential enough on the
regression model that they cover the effects of partial boycotts, or also that voters do not
significantly defect from their party during a boycotted election to vote for another party
that remains in the contest. Measuring the degree of political competitiveness based on
election results presents an imperfect measure because the boycott conceals the actual
balance of power between political factions within a given country.
Electoral violence is the other short term effect considered by both Beaulieu and
Lindberg in their research on election boycotts. Beaulieu finds that overall election vio-
lence is not significantly increased by the occurrence of all boycott types, but is only
related to violence either initiated by the opposition, a far less common type of boy-
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cott than the peaceful, Ghandian type of boycott (2006b). Lindberg finds that violence
and boycotts in African presidential elections are positively related, with the prospect
of boycotts and widespread violence coinciding in 60% of elections (2006). Violence and
boycotts are likely to coincide in African elections because both are either responses to
or causes of a perception of election unfairness. The reasons for electoral violence may
not all be based on opposition activities though. Following Wilkinson’s analysis of elec-
toral violence in Indian elections, both opposition and government use identity-based
violence to mobilize and motivate the electorate (2004). Also, following Schedler’s model
of electoral protest, violent demonstrations by the opposition may in fact be a reaction
to previous manipulative strategies of the incumbent rather than any innate feature of a
boycott (2007). Overall, Beaulieu presents a bleak picture of the prospects for near-term
democratic reform by the increased occurrence of violence, reduction of involvement in
the electoral process, and lack of opposition representation that occurs (2006b)
Long term effects for boycotts receive a slightly more optimistic outlook for democ-
racy, as measured by an increase in democratization index scores, in both studies than
do the short term effects. Beaulieu holds an optimistic view of major election boycotts in
relation to the formation of democracy, arguing that they lead to the creation and estab-
lishment of new democracies in conjunction with international assistance. She claims the
process of democratization by boycotts to be related to the game where the opposition
uses boycotts to either threaten rebellion or undermine international or domestic popular
support in order to force the incumbents to enact reforms that enhance the fairness of the
process or to adhere to existing rules in the presence of outside observers. These proposi-
tions are partially upheld in her analysis; boycotts do increase the likelihood of election
reform and observation in the next election, but neither of these factors are shown to
lead to significantly increased fairness or the removal of the regime from power (Beaulieu
2006b).
Lindberg is less optimistic about election boycotts; he shows that in African elections
opposition participation and concession in elections that are not considered free and
fair more often leads to gradual democratization than would boycotting or rejecting the
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outcome in the same situation (2004, 2006). More generally, Lindberg argues that partic-
ipation in the electoral process leads to a greater increase in the level of democratization
by increasing the level of civil liberties in his studies of African elections, particularly
when coupled with external influences (2007).
If considered in the framework that Schedler presents of authoritarian elections as
a two-level game, the following conclusions can be made from the existing literature on
election boycotts (2002). In regards to the short-term game for immediate power, boycotts
clearly show that the opposition does not benefit by boycotting. Power is not turned over
during elections, and if their goal is democratization, the results of lowered turnout and
increased violence do not favor the construction of a robust democracy. Consideration
of the second level of the game provides mixed results. If we are to believe Beaulieu’s
conclusions, democratically-oriented oppositions are able to extract concessions from the
incumbent over time through boycotting and in this manner are able to gain victories in
the game for control over the processes determining political outcomes. If Lindberg is to
be believed, boycotts are a dead end in both games. In the long term, boycotts allow for
a consolidation of authoritarian rule because of a failure of the opposition to establish
itself as a viable alternative to the incumbent, and thus blocking the development of





All of the theoretical proposals in my model of election boycotts are derived from
Schedler’s modeling of authoritarian elections as a two-level game. From this starting
point, I seek to view how boycotts among other threats to regime stability influence the
survival of regimes against specific types of failure. In doing so, I set my self apart from
the previous approaches in that I do not take sides on the issue of whether boycotts are
an act of pro-democracy protest or another means of authoritarian comepetition.
One approach that my model is open to but that is not ventured by scholars on
electoral competition is that election boycotts and other protests are not as benign as
they appear. Anti-democratic forces may be motivated to use the electoral game in order
to gain greater influence over the process and open their way for an eventual seizure of
power. A cynical reading of Schedler’s approach to protests as part of the two-level game
leads to a possibility that a large opposition group may organize boycotts in what may
be a fair electoral process in order to gain power in future elections (perhaps even by
forcing early elections or re-runs of boycotted elections) where the incumbent has been
demonized as anti-democratic. In this model, election protest may represent a backsliding
in the democratization process initiated by authoritarian-minded opposition groups in
unconsolidated regimes (with either authoritarian or democratic incumbents) rather than
a protest by democratic-minded opposition parties against an authoritarian incumbent.
The first set of models proposes that boycotts are an important part of the two-level
game between the incumbent and opposition forces over electoral rule making. In the
simplest of models, which follows both from Levitsky and Way’s idea of linkage and
leverage as well as Beaulieu’s theories of boycotts as activism, election boycotts of any
type if carried through will lead to the increase of international pressure on the regime
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to change (Beaulieu 2006; Levitsky and Way 2006). If the regime is sufficiently exposed
to these pressures will be forced to reform the electoral process based on pressures from
outside states brought on by internal activists, much like Keck and Sikkink’s “boomerang
effect” (1998). This model claims that the risks to an incumbent regime will increase in
the period after the election as reforms that will need to be made to prevent international
isolation will weaken the ability of the regime to survive future elections. Alternatively,
the impact on regime survival may not come from outside pressure, but rather from
the dynamics of the two-level game between the incumbent and opposition, by which
boycotts allow for the opposition to form a viable coalition in future elections.
If boycotts do bring about electoral reform or otherwise strengthen the opposition
relative to the incumbent, the following hypothesis should be supported by my analysis.
Long term indicators of repeated election boycotts should increase the risk of execu-
tive turnover by elections. In election years, turnover by electoral processes should be
reduced or unchanged because of the lack of opposition contestation. These are the main
components of the electoral model of election boycotts.
• Hypothesis 1a: Long term indicators of boycotts should increase the risk of electoral
turnover.
• Hypothesis 1b: Short term indicators of boycotts should decrease the risk of elec-
toral turnover.
Alternatively, boycotts may bring about an increased likelihood of regime failure
not because of electoral reforms that strengthen the electoral process, but rather by
destabilizing and discrediting the electoral process. This model is indifferent on the goal
of the opposition in calling for boycotts, whether democratic or authoritarian, but rather
considers the possible unintended consequences of boycotting elections. In this model
a number of adverse outcomes are possible. Following Case’s model of transitions from
electoral authoritarianism, the strength of the regime in relation to the opposition may
lead to results such as resignation of the government due to protest, or an intervention by
either the regime or military in order to stabilize the country (2006). Also the heightened
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publicity and polarization of the political process may result in a breakdown in rule, by
either state failure or civil war. The hypothesis for this model is that in both long-term
and immediate indicators of boycotts should increase the risk of non-electoral executive
turnover (coups, civil wars, resignation, foreign interventions, etc). These present the key
elements of the destabilization hypothesis of election boycotts.
• Hypothesis 2a: Long term indicators of boycotts should increase the risk of non-
electoral regime change.




Universe of Cases: Hybrid Regimes
Having already discussed the literature on the causes and effects of boycotts, the next
step is to identify where boycotts are likely to be found. Beaulieu focuses her study of
boycotts on the developing world, which she defines as those countries that are receiving
foreign aid (Beaulieu 2006b). This creates a problem in her design, as one of her key
proposals is that dependence on foreign assistance is more likely to bring about democ-
racy in conjunction with election boycotts. Lindberg is not as particular on defining the
regime, but instead takes a regional perspective on election boycotts as he looks at the
prospects for democratization in Africa (Lindberg 2004, 2006). Given the limitation of
these restrictions, I intend to make a global study of regimes falling between consolidated
democracy and pure authoritarianism. Using this set provides a number of advantages.
First of all, this universe of cases presents one in which there is most likely to be a per-
ception of unfairness by opposition parties that would lead to the decision to make use
of unconventional measures such as boycotting an election. The dynamics of elections
and protest in hybrid democratic-authoritarian systems are a developing field of study.
Finally, the main work covering the topic at present, Schedler’s unpublished work on elec-
toral protests, does not provide a satisfactory answer to the question of election boycotts
due to his use of the level of electoral competition as the dependent variable; which as
stated above creates difficulties in measuring the outcomes of boycotts. For these reasons
I will look into the effects of election boycotts on the survival of the incumbent regime.
A growing body of literature has developed recently considering the intermediate
regimes that are situated in the disputed areas, having some traits of both democratic
and authoritarian regimes. In general there is an agreement that there is a type of
hybrid regime that falls somewhere between the conventional, closed authoritarian regime
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and a fully developed democracy or polyarchy (Diamond 2002, Schedler 2006). These
regimes have been given many different titles: defective democracy, hybrid regimes, semi-
democracy, pseudodemocracy, democracy with adjectives, new authoritarianism, compet-
itive authoritarianism, exclusive republics, guided democracy, illiberal democracy, anoc-
racy, and near-democracy (Diamond 2002, Zakaria 1997, Schedler 2006, Levitsky & Way
2002, van de Walle 2002). The most important element of these regimes is that they use
elections in order to provide legitimacy to the regime’s continued existence. Following
the rapid expansion of democracy since the 1970s and collapse of Marxist-Lenininist
ideology in the late 1980s, electoral democracy has become widely seen as the only legiti-
mate form of government available for new governments, and even authoritarian regimes
have sought to use elections, albeit unfair ones, in order to be considered legitimate
governments (Diamond 2002, Schedler 2006).
A key foundation for the discussion of democracy is Dahl’s concept of polyarchy, and
his two dimensions of regime classification and corresponding four ideal types prove useful
for the purposes of classifying hybrid regimes. Of particular interest are the general types
of competitive oligarchies, those regimes having elite competition and contestation but
with a limited electorate, and inclusive hegemonies, regimes with limited competition
but a broad electorate (Dahl 1971). In delimiting electoral authoritarian regimes, Munck
uses Dahl’s dimensions to limit regimes. Those that allow on the participation dimension
more than one faction with at least one mass group are included. When considering
the dimension of contestation, two situations can immediately be considered electoral
authoritarianism: one is that multiple parties exist, but some that cannot lose elections;
the other possibility consists of multiple parties that can all be defeated, but with some
major factions banned from competition for political reasons (Munck 2006).
Andreas Schedler uses Przeworski’s definition of democracy from Democracy and
Development in order to classify these intermediate regimes (Schedler 2006). Przeworski’s
definition of democracy holds the key elements to be as follows: executive office and the
legislature must be filled by election; more than one party exists in the polity; and finally,
alternation of power occurs in the regimes that are considered democratic (Przeworski
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et al. 2000). Schedler’s electoral authoritarian regime retains the electoral process but it
is not fair, and the incumbent regime uses manipulation and persuasion to prevent the
opposition from ever taking power. The opposition is thus simultaneously demoralized by
knowing there is almost no possibility of immediate electoral victory and encouraged by
the possibility that they may damage the regime in the long term by competing (Schedler
2006).
Electoral authoritarian and hybrid regimes must also be separated not only from
fully democratic regimes but also from fully authoritarian regimes. Schedler defines this
separation along the following dimensions: top levels of government are open to compe-
tition, franchise is not restricted as in competitive oligarchy, head of government is not
exempted from competition, opposition must be independent and not a manufactured
opposition, and finally, authoritarianism is not defined by the use of power but access to
power. Electoral authoritarian regimes also have nearly universal suffrage and are mini-
mally competitive, minimally pluralistic, minimally open, and have limited but systematic
manipulation on elections (Schedler 2006). Schedler’s definition is a useful starting point
for defining hybrid regimes, but it is too restrictive, particularly in not allowing for the
inclusion of regimes with restricted offices and electorates, which comprise a small but
important subset of regimes in which election boycotts may occur.
Other hybrid regimes may vary along the degrees of how competition for power oper-
ates. Levitsky and Way in their discussion of competitive authoritarianism describe the
alternative arrangement of exclusive republics (like Dahl’s exclusive oligarchy), and of
guided democracies, in which there exist some veto players isolated from electoral com-
petition such as the military or clergy above what may otherwise be fair competition
(2002). These definitions of hybrid regimes quite often do not lead to the same set of
regimes included in them. Some definitions, particularly Schedler’s Electoral Authoritar-
ianism, exclude a large number of regimes from consideration that are included in other
authors’ defining of their types of hybrid regimes.
For the purpose of this study, hybrid regimes will be defined following the Polity IV
composite subscore value for political competition (Marshall & Jaggers 2005). This value
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combines measures for the degree of competition in a given country with the restrictions
on that competition. To develop a set of hybrid regimes, all those having a value between
fully restricted (1) and fully open (10) were considered hybrids. The first operationaliza-
tion of regimes is based on measuring executive turnover, and includes the full duration
of executives that had during their existence a period of hybrid rule, even if in that par-
ticular year the country would not be considered a hybrid (an uncommon occurrence in
the data). This data on regime periods is constructed using United States State Depart-
ment country briefs to determine when regimes started or ended and in what manner
the regime ended. When considering spells of hybrid regimes independently of executive
factions, the coding of continuous periods of hybrid values constitute a regime.
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Chapter 5
Competing Risks to Hybrid Regimes
The dependent variable being considered in this study is the duration of hybrid regimes.
In order to test the effects of election boycotts on regime stability, I must also look into
what other risk factors are competing with boycotts in hybrid regimes. The nature of
competition and the types of threats to survival are critical when attempting to determine
which of the competing risk factors are most influential in the survival or demise of these
regimes. Certain elements and dynamics of competition drive these risk factors and must
be drawn out of the literature on hybrid regimes before proceeding to test the effect of
election boycotts on survival.
The consensus in the literature is that while these regimes are not fair regarding
political conduct and contestation, the levels of repression and persecution remains rel-
atively moderate. The ruling party tends not to resort to blatant persecution if at all
possible, and prefers to maintain power through popularity as would a party in a normal
democracy, but will use subtle manipulation if necessary to ensure that they cannot lose
power through elections (Levitsky and Way 2002). Schedler represents this dynamic as
an instance of nested games differing from those in a conventional democracy. The goals
of the actors in electoral authoritarian states can be seen as a two-level game involving
goals of both power and reform, with the ultimate goal of holding the capacity to modify
the rules of the electoral game (Schedler 2002). Oppositions as well as ruling factions
are capable of using the electoral game as a tool to change the future rules, giving each
faction a greater chance of taking or retaining control of the rules of the game (Schedler
2006).
The tools employed by the electoral authoritarian regime depend on a number of fac-
tors related to nature of the regime and level of competition it faces. Some such as van
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de Walle’s contested autocratic regime are so unpopular that they would be unable to
win in fair elections, while others hold enough popularity to win fair elections most of the
time and use unfair tactics to prevent any unexpected outcomes from occurring (2002).
Popular regimes need not use nearly as many repressive tools and often function very
similarly to a political party in fair electoral competition, the difference being that an
electoral authoritarian party will resort to manipulation before accepting defeat. Higher
levels of repression and repeated instances of repression in hybrid regimes should lead
to an increased demand for democratic reform and thus a higher threat of opposition
mobilization and protest against the regime (Schedler 2007). Hybrid regimes can use a
variety of tactics including: reserving certain key positions to appointment; excluding or
fragmenting opposition parties to the point that none could win; targeted disenfranchise-
ment and manipulation of districts and registration; vote buying; intimidation by either
non-secret ballot or violence; and fraud (Case 2006).
The hegemony of liberal ideology in the international system following the collapse
of the Soviet Union has led regimes to increasingly use electoral means to justify their
existence (Levitsky & Way 2002). Outside influences have led recently to a growth in
the number of regimes using elections to legitimize their rule, and location of regimes
(both political and physical) can often determine the prevalence of electoral authori-
tarian regimes. States located in areas dominated by Russia or China today face far
fewer pressures to democratically legitimize their rule than their counterparts in the
Western sphere of influence (Levitsky & Way 2006). Size and international influence are
also critical factors to the behavior of reducing the pressure to draw legitimacy through
popular elections. Levitsky & Way explain these features by the increased costs of repres-
sion in loss of aid or trade for states within the Western sphere and thus a tendency for
electoral legitimacy to be a more important factor for regimes located within these ares
than in others (2006). This line of linkage as a constraint on regime behavior is supported
also by van de Walle’s observation that African countries that receive aid are often led to
the path of electoral, constitutional government, although not necessarily with free and
fair elections (2002).
18
The route of development of these regimes can follow one of many paths: gradual
democratization, as in Mexico (before the 2006 election at least) and Senegal; sudden
regime collapse to democracy as in Peru and Serbia; regression to authoritarianism as in
Azerbaijan; or finally the maintenance of a long-term static game (Schedler 2006). Van
de Walle presents another option for regime evolution in which the opposition is strong
enough to defeat and replace the existing authoritarian regime as another hegemonic and
manipulative regime (2002). The duration of hybrid regimes also varies widely, with some
surviving less than a full election cycle, others oscillating to and from closed authoritari-
anism or democracy, continuing to function for decades, or slowly democratizing (Schedler
2006).
What determines the survival or demise of electoral authoritarian regimes? Case
presents a model in which the repressive skill and capacity of the regime is the deciding
factor in regime survival (2006). Based on case studies in Southeast Asia, regimes are
stable until faced with some form of exogenous shock and must use more manipulative
and repressive actions to survive than would be normally needed. The relative power of
the opposition to the skill of regime manipulation of events determine the path: regimes
with high levels of manipulative capacity will persist in their current form despite opposi-
tion strength, while those with low levels of manipulative capacity will democratize if the
opposition is strong, or revert to closed authoritarianism in the case of a weak opposition
(Case 2006). Powerful regimes, particularly military regimes are often able to hold con-
trol by reverting to closed authoritarianism in the face of miscalculating the opposition
strength, while personalist and party regimes are much more likely to be forced to step
down following a botched manipulation and an unexpected opposition victory (Snyder
2006).
Literature regarding the effects of boycotts on regimes focuses particularly on Africa,
a region noted for the high levels of occurrence of hybrid electoral regimes. As stated
above, there is a very limited body of literature on boycotts, and once again, the two
authors who have written on boycotts in Africa both come to conflicting conclusions.
Bratton concludes that boycotts in Africa do not break down democracy, but reinforce
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the norm that elections are the only legitimate route for change in power and that there is
a positive effect caused by the mobilization of the opposition in the boycott, which can be
seen as a dedication to democratic processes by the opposition (1998). Lindberg reaches
a different conclusion that the same aim of reinforcing the democratic process is suited
best by opposition contestation even in unfair elections, as continued participation by
the opposition will eventually lead to democratization (2004). Lindberg also argues that
the survival of electoral authoritarian regimes in Africa is determined by their survival
of the second contested election, most regimes are considered legitimate after this cycle
even if they are not holding free and fair elections (2006).
These should influence my dependent variable, regime duration, in the following ways.
Increased levels of competition in previous elections should increase the risk of electoral
turnover, as the incumbent will be more reliant upon manipulation with an established
and popular opposition. Along with competition, the more frequently elections are held,
the more opportunities for regime termination exist, thus elections represent an increased
risk. Increasing levels of economic development should provide an environment more con-
ductive to democratic reform and should increase the risk of electoral turnover. Linkages
to Western democracies should constrain the manipulation options of the incumbent and
increase the risk of electoral turnover. As the capacity of a regime to restrict competi-
tion and repress opposition members increases, the risk of an electoral defeat should be
reduced, though the risk of violent change may increase. Finally shocks and economic




In order to test my hypotheses, I will use the same methods for determining boycotts
as Beaulieu used in her study of boycotts in developing countries from 1990-2002, by
searching through the Lexis Nexis database for reports of elections and boycotts in each
election year of the regime periods defined above, and using this information to classify
these into either minor or major boycotts as described above. According to my opera-
tionalization, boycotts are also considered to occur if banned parties make a public call
for voters to avoid the polls as a protest to the proscription of their party. Boycotts of
either type were observed in 32% of the 640 election years in the period of study, equally
divided between major and minor boycotts.
Although I recorded minor boycotts as well, only major boycotts are considered in
the data analysis. This is because of the wide variation in motives and tactics for minor
boycotts. Some are simply protests by minor groups and single-issue parties that could
never win representation even in free and fair elections. Only major boycotts fit properly
into the model of the two-level game in which a party gives up a certain opportunity to
gain representation (the power game) in favor of making a protest against the unfairness
of the system (the rule-making game).
Elections were determined both from the country histories used to assemble the list
of regimes and online election databases, then confirmed when searching for election
boycotts. The values and coding for the other variables will be described below:
• Boycott Short-term effects: This is a binary variable indicating the presence of a
boycott in a given year, coded as described above. Variables considering boycotts
of parliamentary and presidential elections separately are also used.
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• Boycott Long-term effects: This variable and its equivalents for presidential and
parliamentary boycotts is constructed by dividing the number of boycotts having
occurred in a regime up to the given year by the age of the regime.
• Election: This is also a binary variable indicating the presence of a national-level
election in a given year, coded as described above.
• Development: The value of GDP per capita in constant 2000 dollars from the World
Bank World Development Indicators [WDI]. The natural log value is used in order
to counteract nonlinear variance in the Martingale residuals for the Cox regression.
• Growth: The percentage change in GDP per capita from the previous year also
obtained from the WDI.
• Repressive Capacity: Indicated by the PHYSINT composite score from CIRI that
combines indicators for torture, extra-judicial killings, political imprisonment, and
disappearance. The index ranges from a value of 0 indicating no protections to 8
indicating full protection in practice.
• Restrictive Capacity: Indicated by the EMPINX composite score from CIRI that
combines indicators for freedoms of movement, speech, and religion and also
worker’s rights and political participation. This index ranges from a minimum of 0
for no rights to one of 10 for full rights in practice. This variable is exponentially
transformed in order to counteract nonlinear variance in the Martingale residuals
for the Cox regression.
• Linkage and Leverage (partial sample): Following Levitsky & Way, this original
measure combines the region, percent of GDP accounted for by trade with the
United States, percent of GDP accounted for by fuel exports, and the relation of
a country in alliances with the United States in both the Cold War and War on
Terror. 1
1This data was only available for a smaller set of years and was not used in all calculations
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• Linkage and Leverage (full sample): Similar to above, but only considers region and
alliances in order to avoid missing data problems with GDP data and fuel exports.
• Presidential system: From the World Bank’s Database of Political Institutions
(DPI), indicates that the highest executive body is elected independently from
the assembly (1 Presidential, 0 Other) (Keefer 2005).
• Competitiveness: Competition value from Vanhannen’s polyarchy index. Measures
the combined proportion of the vote received by all but the top finishing party.
This value has been lagged one year to indicate the degree of competition in the
previous election.
• Mean District Magnitude: From the World Bank DPI. 2




In order to test the effects of election boycotts and other competing risks on regime
survival, I will use event-history analysis. These models determine the degree to which
each contributing independent variable influences the dependent variable of duration of
the unit in question, in my case a political regime. The event history tool that I will
use is the semi-parametric Cox partial likelihood estimation. The choice of this model is
mainly due to the risks of incorrectly specifying the baseline hazard function in one of the
parametric estimators (Blossfeld et al 2007). As the literature on electoral authoritarian
regimes provides little in the way of substantive justification for using a given parametric
model of regime survival, I will use the Cox semi-parametric model to avoid this problem.
I will test both models using this method, differing on how the exit condition is specified.
Individual country effects that are not accounted for by the independent variables will be
managed through the specification of shared frailty based upon country cluster, so that
successive regimes in the same territory will face a similar elevated or reduced threat.
Four tests will be constructed in order to assess my hypotheses. Each test will be
run for combined major boycotts, and then again with presidential and parliamentary
elections split. They will also be divided into a full sample test and a reduced sample test.
The full sample will not include the electoral system and district magnitude variables
and use a simplified version of the linkage and leverage index in order to increase the
number of observations under study. The reduced sample will include these variables and
use a more precise measure of linkage and leverage, but at the expense of reducing the
number of observations that can be studied due to missing data, particularly data from
the smaller countries before 1990.
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The first set of tests will test the electoral reform hypothesis by investigating the
effect of the independent variables on only the regime failures that occur due to electoral
turnover. The second set will test the destabilization hypothesis by investigating the effect
of the independent variables on non-electoral turnover. The indicator for non-electoral
turnover includes the following events: military coup or civil war defeat, state collapse,





The full sample model of electoral reform included 267 regimes in 109 countries that were
at risk of failure for 1906 years and experienced 133 instances of executive turnover by
elections. During the regression process some of the variables showed violations of the
proportional hazards assumption for the Cox semi-parametric regression and required
corrective measures to be taken. 1
As is expected, the model of all major boycotts combined (see table 8.1) shows boy-
cotts to have a strikingly negative effect on immediate electoral turnover, with a hazard
ratio well below one, indicating that there is a strong impact on risk and a level of sig-
nificance comfortably above the standard alpha value of 0.01. The long term effects of
major boycotts is the opposite, with a hazard ratio showing an increase well above one
and significance at the 0.01 level. Elections as would be expected have an extremely large
effect on the hazard ratio (electoral turnover cannot happen without an election except
for shifts in coalition governments and the delay in inauguration). The level of compe-
tition in the previous election appears to have the opposite impact on survival, but the
effect on the risk of electoral turnover is insignificant. As expected, increasing levels of
economic development positively impacts the likelihood of electoral turnover, although
the results are not quite significant at the 0.05 level.
When the type of election is divided up between boycotts of parliamentary and pres-
idential elections, the outcomes are surprising (see table 8.2). For both types the short-
term impact insignificantly increased the risk of electoral turnover, with parliamentary
1Non-linear transformations were used on development, empinx, and linkage and leverage3
in order to correct for non-linear variance in the Martingale residuals. The failure of the trans-
formed empinx and development variables to meet the proportional hazard assumption was also
corrected for by including a variable for the interaction with the natural log of time to correct
this violation (Box-Steffenmier & Jones 2004).
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Table 8.1: Electoral Reform Combined
Combined Election Types
Independent Variable Hazard Ratio (S.E.) z P > |z|
Short-term Boycott 0.230 (0.118) -2.86 0.004
Long-term Boycott 6.550 (4.520) 2.72 0.006
National Election 47.546 (17.801) 10.31 0.000
Competitiveness 0.999 ( 0.010) -0.07 0.941
Interacted Comp. 1.012 (0.007) 1.79 0.073
Pres. System 0.768 (0.181) -1.12 0.264
Development 1.566 (0.361) 1.94 0.052
Interact. Devel. 0.790 (0.104) -1.78 0.075
Growth 0.988 (0.015) -0.77 0.441
Repressive Cap. 1.054 (0.054) 1.04 0.297
Restrictive Cap. 0.999 (0.000) -1.28 0.200
Interact. Rest. Cap. 1.000 (0.000) 2.00 0.045
Linkage and Leverage 1.138 (0.147) 1.00 0.319




boycotts closer to significance. This may be because of election timing in which both
occur in the same year, parliamentary elections are boycotted but presidential elections
are won. The most intriguing finding is that boycotts of presidential elections are much
more likely to lead to electoral turnover, while parliamentary boycotts have the oppo-
site effect of making turnover extremely unlikely in the long term. This may be because
parties boycotting parliamentary elections have a different payoff structure, losing repre-
sentation makes it harder to set the electoral rules in the future and may only be seen as a
good option when the opposition is extremely desperate for outside support. Presidential
boycotts on the other hand are more effective due to the all or nothing nature of pres-
idential elections. Here an opposition party can gain in the power game by contesting
in the assembly elections as well as gaining in the rule-making game by boycotting a
presidential election they would be unable to win because of probable manipulation.
The other variables behave as expected, with both types of elections being influential
and increasing the risk of electoral turnover, although not as influential as the boycott of
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a presidential election. Presidential systems as well are significantly more insulated from
electoral turnover than parliamentary systems, most likely due to the fact that electoral
turnover can only occur at presidential elections, rather than the collapse of a coalition
government or a move for snap-elections in a parliamentary system. The final variable of
interest in this analysis is the degree of restrictive capacity. Unlike expected, as this level
decreases (an increase in the index) the ability of the incumbent to survive elections is
increased. This may be because these regimes are more popular and need less restriction.
Too much weight should not be placed on this finding due to the miniscule effect upon the
risk and also the fact that the interaction variable has an opposite and equally miniscule
impact. 2
Table 8.2: Electoral Reform Divided
Divided Election Types
Independent Variable Hazard Ratio (S.E.) z P > |z|
Parl. Short-term 1.556 (0.493) 1.39 0.163
Pres. Short-term 1.037 (0.399) 0.10 0.923
Pres. Long-Term 32.774 (30.265) 3.78 0.000
Parl. Long-term 0.018 (0.022) -3.29 0.001
Pres. Election 5.023 (1.247) 6.50 0.000
Parl. Election 8.805 (2.285) 8.38 0.000
Competitiveness 1.009 (0.010) 0.95 0.340
Interact. Compet. 1.0081 (0.006) 1.22 0.221
Pres. System 0.504 (0.111) -3.10 0.002
Development 1.461 (0.285) 1.95 0.052
Interact. Development 0.846 (0.098) -1.44 0.150
Growth 1.006 (0.015) 0.45 0.651
Repressive Cap. 1.073 (0.050) 1.51 0.130
Restrictive Cap. 0.999 (0.000) -2.28 0.022
Interact. Rest. Cap. 1.000 (0.000) 2.90 0.004
Linkage and Leverage 0.873 (0.103) -1.14 0.253




The destabilization model provides different results. In the large set analysis the
2Reduced sample tests were run on all of these variables as well as district magnitude and
a more precise measurement of linkage and leverage. The results showed no meaningful change
with either variable and reduced the level of significance, but no change in direction for the
other variables from the large set.
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same set of regimes is at risk for the same time period, but only forty-two regimes end
in non-electoral failures. In this regression, major boycotts have an insignificant effect of
increasing the likelihood of destabilization in the short term, which is not surprising if
pre-election boycotts are sometimes tied to post-elections protests and refusals to accept
the results of the election. In the long term, major boycotts insignificantly reduce the
likelihood of turnover by non-electoral means, likely because of the increased possibility
of turnover by electoral means as seen in the preceding test. The only variable in this
model with a significant influence on regime survival at the 0.05 level is the degree of
competitiveness in elections. Higher levels of opposition vote-share tend to decrease the
likelihood of a non-electoral turnover of power, once again this is likely because of an
increased possibility of electoral turnover. At the 0.1 level of significance, the value for
physical repression is also significant and indicates that lower levels of repression are
associated with a lower likelihood of non-electoral executive turnover, possibly because
of a connection between physical repression and general levels of political violence in a
given country.
When non-electoral regime failures (table 8.3) are considered the results are much less
clear. In the full sample, major boycotts of any election type had an insignificant result,
though the directions were as expected 3. Short-term impacts tended to increase the risk
of regime collapse, while long term results reduced the impact, although the results were
extremely insignificant. The only variables in this analysis that came close to having a
significant impact on the duration of regimes were the values for restrictive and repressive
capacity. Both indicated that for less restrictive regimes there was a lower likelihood for
a non-electoral end of the regime, likely because the opposition does not feel a need to
take action outside the political system to take power. Of the two, repressive capacity
has the greater effect, while restrictive capacity, although significant at the 0.1 level, had
almost no impact on regime risk.
When considering the reduced sample (table 8.4), the results were somewhat changed,
although no variables were significant at the 0.5 level. 4 The directions on the variables
3When the split election types were used, the results were similar.
4The split model was unable to successfully calculate hazard ratios as the likelihood estimates
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Table 8.3: Destabilization Large
Combined, Full Sample
Independent Variable Hazard Ratio (S.E.) z P > |z|
Short-Term Boycott 2.161 (1.779) 0.94 0.349
Long-Term Boycott 0.587 (0.798) -0.39 0.696
Election 0.664 (0.302) -0.90 0.370
Competitiveness 1.023 (0.017) 1.41 0.160
Interact. Comp. 0.986 (0.009) -1.37 0.171
Pres. System 0.894 (0.322) -0.31 0.758
Development 1.214 (0.389) 0.60 0.545
Interact. Devel. 0.794 (0.152) -1.20 0.229
Growth 0.983 (0.023) -0.70 0.485
Repressive Cap. 0.880 (0.068) -1.63 0.102
Restrictive Cap. 0.999 (0.000) -0.73 0.465
Interact. Rest. Cap. 0.999 (0.000) -0.67 0.501
Linkage and Leverage 1.375 (0.326) 1.35 0.178




were unchanged, but the significance levels did change, with restrictive and repressive
capacity no longer significant at the 0.1 level. Major boycotts did become significant at
the 0.1 level and indicated that there may be a degree of increased risk of non-electoral
change in the year of a boycott, although there is a large amount of variation. The
enhanced linkage and leverage index appears to indicate that increased ties to Western
democracies leads to a slightly increased risk of non-electoral failures, but the degree of
impact is very small.
did not converge, most likely due to the small number of failures.
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Table 8.4: Destabilization Small
Combined, Reduced Set
Independent Variable Hazard Ratio (S.E.) z P > |z|
Short-Term Boycott 5.164 (4.765) 1.78 0.075
Long-Term Boycott 0.519 (0.828) -0.41 0.681
Election 0.697 (0.393) -0.64 0.523
Competitiveness 0.992 (0.011) -0.65 0.513
Pres. System 0.668 (0.277) -0.97 0.332
Development 0.935 (0.182) -0.34 0.733
Growth 0.996 (0.026) -0.14 0.886
Repressive Cap. 0.883 (0.087) -1.25 0.211
Restrictive Cap. 0.999 (0.000) -1.42 0.155
Linkage and Leverage 1.017 (0.009) 1.91 0.057
District Magnitude 1.004 (0.006) 0.62 0.535







Election boycotts appear to have mixed effects, depending on the type of boycott and the
time scale considered. Minor boycotts appear to follow no clear pattern 1. After noting all
of the variation within the category of minor boycotts during the process of coding these
events, this is not a surprising finding. My anecdotal analysis of minor boycotts indicates
that there are many different types. Some consist of the objections of small, religious
communities and ethnic groups seeking public attention to their cause by advocating
for their followers to reject the election process. These can occur for reasons other than
seeking political improvements and in some cases are about issues completely unrelated
to the electoral process. Others are more similar to labor strikes in which services critical
to the electoral process in a particular community or area are denied, causing disruptions
to the process. Yet others are violent and seek not to disrupt the voting by constituents of
the group calling for the boycott, but for the general disruption of the election process by
destroying election infrastructure (ballots, polling centers, observers, poll workers, etc.).
What this appears to indicate is that boycotts that do not involve a large portion
of already organized political parties should not be considered as an influential part of
the electoral game, but rather should be considered as another form of general political
protest. These minor boycotts are more closely related to general protests, boycotts of
government service providers, and strikes than they are to major election boycotts and
post-election protest. Because of this, it is not surprising that there was no indication
of any clear effect of minor boycotts on the improvement of election processes in hybrid
regimes.
1Preliminary analysis included minor boycotts as well as major boycotts in the analysis
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As far as major boycotts are concerned, the findings appear to show that they are in
fact a useful strategy for those seeking to unseat an incumbent regime. The short term
effects on electoral turnover indicate clearly that boycotting an election means sacrificing
the possibility of regime change today for the increased possibility of change in the future.
The process through which this occurs cannot not clearly determined by the tests used
in this study, but some possibilities can be assessed for future analysis.
My findings do not completely refute Beaulieu’s proposition that boycotts lead to
electoral reforms that improve the future chances of electoral victory by opposition can-
didates. Her connection of dependence on the West as the main pressure for change
however, is not supported in my model, although it is possible that some other opera-
tionalization for linkage may provide that connection. This partial failure of Beaulieu’s
model lends support to the idea that boycotts have some inherent ability to improve the
chances of future success by opposition parties. One area deserving of further investiga-
tion is what I will call a coalescence model of boycotts. This model is similar to Van
de Walle’s concept of electoral authoritarian competition as a tipping game in which
the opposition is able to come together in order to defeat the incumbent (2006). In this
case, boycotts allow an opposition that cannot agree to running a unified candidate or
platform to cooperate against the incumbent’s attempts to divide the opposition, while
at the same time remaining a publicly visible political force.
The relation of executive turnover in the context of democratization depends on how
one defines positive democratization. Using the idea of turnover in the executive as a pos-
itive indicator of democracy leads to the conclusion that election boycotts are an effective
means for bringing about democratic transitions. On the other hand, if democratization
means moving from a hybrid regime to consolidated democracy, the evidence appears
less optimistic. In the original hypothesis testing for this project, I produced a model
designed to measure if regimes are more or less likely to exit hybrid status as democ-
racy or authoritarian as a result of election boycotts. A model testing regime failure as
moving from hybrid to either democratic or authoritarian was not included because of
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the number of transitions was too small to analyze. 2 Although not a robust statistical
finding, this lack of transitions appears to indicate that even though boycotts clearly
produce electoral turnover, the new regime is not likely to be significantly more or less
democratic than that which it replaces.
As far as the significance of this finding in the context of the general literature on
hybrid regimes, it appears to indicate that for the most part these are not transitional
regimes indicating an intermediate step in the process of democratization. Rather, these
hybrid regimes are a very stable state in which the bulk of countries find themselves
becoming consolidated hybrids during the past three decades.
Finally, boycotts appear to be a low-risk option for oppositions in the game of democ-
ratization. Even if the ability to bring improvements beyond electoral turnover is ques-
tionable, there is not sufficient evidence to point to election boycotts leading to a break-
down of the electoral process. Boycotts may disrupt the particular election in which they
occur, but because of the long-term goal of the action, this action does not present an
immediate threat to the regime . Indeed, boycotts provide the appearance of government
consolidation as the incumbent is able to gain more power in the current election. This
also may be a reason for the increased possibility of electoral turnover in the future, as
the incumbent following a boycott finds the electoral process to be a secure means of
legitimizing rule and overestimates its security, thus opening the regime to future failure
when the opposition does decide to contest in future elections.
2The lack of cases meant it was not possible to get conclusive results due to the lack of
failures to either type.
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